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THE TUNNELS THAT CONNECT HAMPTON ROADS:
WONDERFUL ASSETS OR POTENTIAL ACHILLES’ HEELS?
Achilles’ Heel: a metaphor describing a potentially fatal weakness despite overall strength

ampton Roads hosts the second-largest seaport on the Atlantic Coast and the largest naval base in the world. Its very existence is defined by the Atlantic Ocean

H

and the many bodies of water that flow from many parts of Virginia into the ocean. Waterways such as the James River once profoundly divided the region.
In 1930, an individual wishing to travel from downtown Hampton to downtown Norfolk faced two choices – a long and circuitous land trip that could
approach 25 miles (via the James River Bridge on Route 17, which opened in 1928), or a boat ride.

The opening of the first major tunnel connecting the Peninsula with Southside (the
3.5-mile Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel in 1957) changed matters dramatically.
Now it was possible for automobiles and trucks to travel back and forth
between the Peninsula and Southside directly and with comparative ease. This
cut many miles and considerable time off such a trip and might well be
regarded as a definitive move in support of the notion of a region called
Hampton Roads.
Four other major tunnels exist in our area: the .65-mile Downtown Tunnel (1952)
and the .8-mile Midtown Tunnel (1962), connecting Norfolk and Portsmouth;
the 17.6-mile Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel (1964), linking Virginia Beach to
the Eastern Shore; and the 4.6-mile Monitor Merrimac Memorial Bridge-Tunnel
(1992), connecting Suffolk and Newport News.

they were closed, for whatever reason, or were rendered inoperable for long
periods of time?

Are European Examples
Relevant to Hampton Roads?
Tunnel incidents since 1995 have killed 713 people worldwide. Among the
highly publicized have been:
 Mont Blanc Tunnel Fire (March

Taken together, these five bridge/tunnel complexes unite the region and stimulate commerce. Without them, the bustling Port of Hampton Roads would be a
shadow of what we see today because trucks handle significant proportions of
the goods that flow through the port. The bridges and tunnels also provide critical infrastructure to support the numerous Department of Defense installations
and activities within the region. And, during hurricane season, they provide the
promise of serving as evacuation routes.
A recitation of the positive impact of our region’s bridges and tunnels on economic and social life in Hampton Roads virtually begs the question: What if
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1999): The Mont Blanc Tunnel connects Italy and France. This disaster
(41 deaths) occurred when a truck
carrying nine tons of margarine and
12 tons of flour caught fire. All but
seven of those who died stayed in
their cars rather than attempt to
access “escape” rooms located inside the tunnel, though it is not clear
they could have survived even had they tried. The fires burned for two
days. Opened in 1965, the Mont Blanc Tunnel was designed for
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450,000 vehicles per year, but already was handling 1.1 million vehicles annually by 1997.
 Tauern Tunnel Accident/Fire (May 1999): The Tauern Tunnel is located

near Salzburg, Austria, and was only two lanes at the time of the accident, which was caused by an early-morning collision and fire involving
60 trucks and killing 12 people.
 Gotthard Tunnel Accident/Fire (October 2001): Located in Switzerland,

this tunnel is more than 10 miles long. A collision between two trucks
resulted in fires that killed 12 people, primarily from smoke and heat
that reached more than 1,800 degrees.
 Channel Tunnel Fires (November 1996, August 2006, September

2008): The Channel Tunnel connects the United Kingdom and France.
Three significant fires aboard trains have closed the tunnel since it
opened in 1994.
What lessons did Europeans learn from these accidents (none of which involved
terrorism)?
 Tunnels are constantly vulnerable to accidents and mishaps that not only

result in deaths, but also close them to traffic for periods of time –
ranging up to three years, as was the case following the Mont Blanc
Tunnel fire.
 Some fires in tunnels are virtually unavoidable and therefore are consid-

ered to be routine incidents. (The Lincoln and Holland tunnels in New
York City each experience several car fires per year.) The possibility of
fire requires that routine, easily implemented protocols exist to deal with
such occurrences.
 Bidirectional (two-lane) tunnels are substantially more susceptible to acci-

dents than dual (twin-tube) carriageway tunnels.
 Not surprisingly, tunnels that allow transiting vehicles to carry flammable

 Bad driving and unwise employee judgments have caused nearly every

major tunnel accident. Terrorism might produce the same effects, but no
major tunnel disaster has been the result of terrorism, although English
authorities reported they foiled an attempt by Islamic terrorists to blow
up the Channel Tunnel in 2006.
 The first 10 minutes are decisive when it comes to saving people’s lives

and limiting material damage (e.g., in the case of the Gotthard Tunnel
accident, experts were surprised by how rapidly toxic fumes spread and
visibility declined; this led to the loss of life).
 Tunnel users often fail to recognize emergency signs, which has resulted

in fatal consequences for those trying to escape.
 The probability of a tunnel accident increases as the volume of traffic in

the tunnel increases.
 It is possible to screen many, but not all, potentially dangerous cargoes

before they enter tunnels; however, the costs associated with detecting
sophisticated dangers (for example, those relating to radiation) can be
very high.
 Among the most efficient and low-cost means of reducing the frequency

and severity of tunnel accidents are: (1) mandating smaller fuel tanks for
heavy-goods vehicles; (2) providing tunnels with heat-seeking cameras;
(3) restricting the amount of fuel that heavy-goods vehicles may carry
into a tunnel; (4) requiring certain vehicles to carry fire-extinguishing
equipment; and (5) regulating distances between vehicles.
Readers will recognize that several of the recommended precautions could be
implemented immediately in our region’s tunnels, but others (such as regulating
distances between vehicles) would cause immediate problems. We can only
wish good luck to any authority that attempts to enforce meaningful “distance
between vehicles” regulations in the Downtown and Midtown tunnels during
weekday rush hours.

and explosive materials are susceptible to much more destructive accidents. Convincing drivers not to carry illegal materials through tunnels is
a never-ending task.
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How Vulnerable Are We in
Hampton Roads?
It should come as no surprise that regional authorities are paying increased
attention to Hampton Roads’ bridge-tunnel vulnerabilities and are actively
involved in assessing emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protection plans. Addressing these risks and mitigating their potential impacts remain
top priorities, not only among the general public, but also with Hampton Roads
policy makers.
Let’s look at some of the considerations. The overall level of risk to one of our
tunnels due to an adverse event is a function of three primary factors:
a. Importance Factor (I) – This is a straightforward measure of the socioeconomic importance of a tunnel and its operation. Typically, a quantitative
measure is developed to account for the following attributes of the tunnel:
1. Financial importance to the regional economy
2. Importance to the regional transportation network
3. Importance as an emergency evacuation route
4. Exposed population in the tunnel when the adverse event occurs
b. Occurrence Factor (O) – This variable measures the probability of an
adverse event occurring. Most often, this measure takes the following into
account:
1. Level of exposure to risk events
2. Level of security
3. Frequency of exposure to adverse events (e.g., frequency of large-truck
traffic with potentially dangerous cargoes)

c. Vulnerability Factor (V) – This variable measures the consequences of an
adverse event to the tunnel, its occupants and neighboring populations. It usually incorporates the following measures:
1. Expected financial damage to the tunnel
2. Expected replacement value
3. Expected downtime or closure of the tunnel
4. Expected number of casualties (deaths or severe injuries)
5. Value of reduced economic activity.
The I, O and V factors enable risk evaluators to evaluate the impact of adverse
events. Let’s delve into this process in more detail to get a better sense of how
this occurs.
Table 1 provides an example of how the Importance, Occurrence and Vulnerability factors might be defined and developed. It uses ranges (low to high), likelihoods and expected losses (denoted by red, yellow and green, which
correspond to high, medium and low severity) to describe a given adverse
event in one of the region’s five tunnels. A 1-5 scale is used to assign probabilities (least likely to most likely) and losses (smallest to largest) to each adverse
event to which a tunnel might be exposed.
Table 2 extends this analysis to the five tunnels in Hampton Roads for 2008 to
reflect the size of monetary and human losses connected to an adverse event.
The next step is to translate Table 2’s values into a scale that varies between 0
and 1. The translation in Table 3 is based upon a “fuzzy” equation where the
translated factor is equivalent to the average of the values for all risk events,
divided by 10. The translation for the importance factor is a one-to-one mapping where an assessment of “high” corresponds to a value of 1, an assessment
of “medium” corresponds to .50 and an assessment of “low” corresponds to a
value of 0, etc.
Finally, let’s take the values of Table 3 and translate them into an overall risk prioritization score (RPS) that takes into account all three factors (importance, fre-
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TABLE 2

TABLE 1
CONNECTING RISK FACTORS TO AN EVENT’S IMPORTANCE

ADVERSE EVENT EXAMPLES FOR THE FIVE
HAMPTON ROADS TUNNELS

Risk Scale Example

2008 Factor Translation Example

Importance Occurrence
Factor
Factor

Scales

Low / High

Likelihood

Vulnerability Factor
Monetary
Loss

Human Loss

Severity
(Dollars)

Severity
(Deaths)

Risk Events

Importance
Factor

Occurrence
Factor

Vulnerability Factor

Low – High

Likelihood

Monetary Loss
Human Loss
(Dollars)
(Deaths/Injuries)

HRBT
Car Accident
Flooding

1

Low

<1%

2

Low to Medium

1-5%

3

Medium

5-10%

Car Accident

4

Medium to
High

10-50%

Flooding

5

High

>50%

High

Fire
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2

3

3

2

2

2

2

4

1

1

3

3

1

2

2

1

5

1

2

4

3

2

2

2

2

5

1

2

4

3

2

2

2

2

3

1

1

3

4

1

1

2

1

MMBT

High

Fire

Midtown Tunnel
Car Accident

quency of occurrence and vulnerability). The risk prioritization scores in Table 4
are the product of the equation RPS = I • O • V. These scores enable us to
say that, all things considered, the Hampton Roads Bridge-Tunnel (HRBT) merits
our greatest attention if and when we worry about adverse events. Taking
into account the HRBT’s importance, the likelihood of an
adverse event occurring there, and its potential vulnerability,
the HRBT receives the highest risk ranking. The lowest risk
ranking belongs to the Chesapeake Bay Bridge-Tunnel (CBBT)
and hence it merits the least attention of any of the five tunnels when we consider how to deal with adverse events. Note
that “least attention” is not equivalent to “no attention.” Adverse events (e.g., car
and truck accidents, flooding, fire) are fully capable of causing significant problems at the CBBT. However, all things considered, these problems are much
smaller for the CBBT than is the case for the HRBT and MMBT.

5

Flooding

Medium

Fire

Downtown Tunnel
Car Accident
Flooding

Medium

Fire

CBBT
Car Accident
Flooding
Fire

Medium to
High
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Regional Infrastructure
Independence

TABLE 3
A SCALE FOR ADVERSE EVENTS:
THE FIVE HAMPTON ROADS TUNNELS
Importance Factor

Occurrence Factor

Vulnerability Factor

HRBT
1

.33

.20

MMBT
1

.30

.15

Midtown Tunnel
.5

.37

.20

Downtown Tunnel
.5

.37

.20

CBBT
.75

.23

.17

TABLE 4
RELATIVE RISK RANKINGS:
THE FIVE HAMPTON ROADS TUNNELS
Tunnel

Risk Prioritization
Score

HRBT

.0670

MMBT

.0450

Midtown Tunnel

.0370

Downtown Tunnel

.0370

CBBT

.0293
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The tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, in New York City and at the Pentagon
served to re-emphasize what often is termed the “cascade” effect. The major
building blocks of a modern urban civilization are interrelated and interdependent. When one part of New York City’s infrastructure was destroyed or
failed, this rippled into other parts of the city and knocked out other vital functions as well.
Suppose a destructive hurricane were to hit Hampton Roads. Likely, it would
knock out electricity, disrupt natural gas delivery, diminish our ability to communicate, limit our ability to access television and radio, and perhaps flood or block
off one or more tunnels. Clearly, our ability to deal with any one of these
calamities depends at least partially upon the continuing operation of the
remaining pieces of infrastructure.
Unfortunately, somewhat like a domino effect, the destruction of one piece of
infrastructure (electrical service) often does impede or even knock down other
pieces of infrastructure (television and radio reception and, in the case of New
York City, subways). Hence, any analysis of the impact of adverse events upon
our region’s tunnels must be approached from an overall systems point of view.
Everything is related and the experience of 9/11 reveals that infrastructure failures often cascade. Both foresight and wise planning are required to minimize
the probability that infrastructure failures spread like a contagious disease.

Risk Rank

HAMPTON ROADS 2009

Page 131

Final Reflection:
Accidents and Terrorism
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All of the major European tunnel episodes that we described earlier were
accidents and not the result of terrorist actions. Even so, a terrorist,
especially a suicidal terrorist, could replicate the tragic results of these
accidents. In fact, Hampton Roads is vulnerable to terrorist
attacks directed against many different key components of
its infrastructure – not just bridges and tunnels, but also
electrical, natural gas and water supplies, and tall buildings. The possibility of chemical and radiation attacks on
the region, or even the detonation of small atomic
weapons, cannot be discarded due to the overriding
importance of the military installations located in our
midst. Prudence requires that we be mindful of and
prepare for such possibilities.
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